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ABSTRACT
This paper studies multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public
goods. In the ﬁrst stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be con-
ditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their
own contributions and fulﬁll any commitments made in the ﬁrst stage. Equilibrium con-
tributions are characterized under diﬀerent assumptions about the commitment ability of
players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to
discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustain-
able without a central authority, and that therefore may be particularly relevant for the
provision of international public goods. Eﬃcient levels of public goods can be achieved
under some circumstances.
Keywords: Voluntary provision, matching contributions, commitment, multiple public
goods
JEL classiﬁcation: H41, H871 Introduction
The search for mechanisms for overcoming the free-rider problem is at the heart of public
economics. Much of the rationale for government can be traced to addressing that issue.
But despite the coercive power of government, it too faces almost insuperable diﬃculties in
achieving optimal levels of public goods. In the absence of markets, there is no automatic
way of determining the beneﬁts that households obtain from public goods. Nonetheless, it
is well known in principle how mechanisms can be designed to induce households to reveal
their preferences for public goods, or even to lead them to voluntarily contribute eﬃcient
amounts of payments (subscriptions) to public goods. Mechanisms such as those proposed
by Clarke (1971) and Groves and Ledyard (1977) can in principle induce truthful revelation
of individual preferences for public goods, and those summarized by Varian (1994a, 1994b)
can induce optimal voluntary subscriptions.
In an international context, where voluntary public goods provision is arguably most
relevant, a further problem arises. Many of the mechanisms proposed require a government
authority that can design and operate the mechanism, and no such authority exists in
an international setting. This poses a challenging problem for some of the key emerging
issues where international free-riding is important. For example, achievement of the United
Nation’s Millennium Development Goals and the meeting of the Kyoto Protocol targets for
global emissions reduction involve voluntary actions by nations acting without the coercive
power of an overriding governing authority. Mechanisms of the sort mentioned above that
require central coordination are no longer available.
There have been a variety of proposals for generating additional revenues for interna-
tional assistance, such as global carbon taxes, taxes on currency exchange, world lotteries
and international capital taxes. However, each of these requires a central authority for their
implementation. Our purpose in this paper is to explore mechanisms that can emerge to
address the free-rider problem in a setting in which no central government exists to in-
duce cooperation. We focus on the extreme case where nations behave non-cooperatively,
although conceivably cooperative mechanisms could also surface, as the Kyoto Protocol
illustrates. Our inspiration is drawn from a remarkable paper by Guttman (1978), who
1showed how extending the voluntary-contribution model to a two-stage setting can have
profound consequences. In his model, agents in a ﬁrst stage announce rates at which
they will match the contributions of other agents. Then in the second stage, given the
announced matching rates, agents choose their own contributions. He showed, using the
special case of quasilinear preferences, that the sub-game perfect equilibrium in such a
two-stage non-cooperative game is fully eﬃcient. Subsequently, Danziger and Schnytzer
(1991) showed that the result could be generalized to more general preferences and to
any number of players. Moreover, equally remarkably, the equilibrium in such a two-stage
contribution game would replicate the Lindahl equilibrium.
The Guttman mechanism, although seductively simple, does involve some strong as-
sumptions. Two of these will be our special focus. The ﬁrst is that the eﬃciency of the
mechanism requires that all agents be able to commit to matching the contributions of oth-
ers in the second stage. Such commitment cannot be taken for granted, as the evidence of
unfulﬁlled promises in response to recent aid campaigns indicates (not to mention unkept
promises under the Kyoto Protocol). Our ﬁrst purpose will be to study the consequences
of more limited commitment ability. In particular, we shall consider the consequences of
only a subset of agents being able to commit. Indeed, in the case where only one agent
can commit to a future contribution policy, some interesting new possibilities arise. First-
stage announcements can then reasonably include not just matching rates, but also levels
of contributions, possibly contingent on the contributions of others. It turns out to be the
case that in these circumstances, even if only one country can commit, an eﬃcient outcome
can occur, albeit not the Lindahl one.
The second assumption in the Guttman mechanism is that there is only one public
good. We shall consider the consequences of extending the analysis to a world with more
than one public good. In a recent paper, Cornes and Itaya (2004) have studied the prop-
erties of non-cooperative contribution games when there are two public goods. We adapt
their model to a two-stage setting where contribution policies are announced in the ﬁrst
period as above. In this context, the issue of commitment involves not only whether an
agent can commit, but also whether the commitment is over one or both public goods.
2The eﬃciency properties of the two-stage mechanisms depend on both these features of
commitment, as well as on whether public goods are supplied simultaneously or sequen-
tially.
To facilitate both the analysis and the intuitive understanding of the results, we con-
duct our analysis in the simplest of settings. We assume that there are two contributing
agents, which we refer to as countries with the international public goods case clearly in
mind. Country utility functions are taken to be loglinear (Cobb-Douglas). This yields
linear reaction functions in the second stage, which enables us both to obtain explicit solu-
tions to the two-stage contribution game and to provide simple geometric interpretations.
The alternative would be to follow Guttman (1978) and Varian (1994a) and assume quasi-
linear utility functions. However, these typically lead to indeterminate or corner solutions
in contributions since reaction functions for the agents are parallel.
We proceed by considering ﬁrst a base case in which there is only one public good
and both countries can commit. This replicates the Guttman-Danziger-Schnytzer analysis,
though some additional insights are obtained by the constructive solutions to which the
loglinear utility function gives rise. We then turn to the case where only one of the countries
can commit, and study diﬀerent contribution policies that can be the basis of commitments.
Next, we allow for two public goods and analyze the consequences of commitment applying
to either one or both public goods. In a ﬁnal section, we brieﬂy consider generalizations
and possible extensions.
2 The Base Case with One Public Good and Full Commitment
The setting consists of two countries, which we call Rome and Greece. Variables applying to
Rome will be denoted using Roman letters, while those for Greece use corresponding Greek
letters. There are initially two goods, a private composite commodity and an international
public good. Consumption levels of the private good are x in Rome and χ in Greece. The
total quantity of the public good, whose beneﬁts accrue to both countries, is denoted G.
Utility functions in the two countries are given by U(G,x)=alnG +l nx and Υ(G,χ)=
αlnG +l nχ. Diﬀerences in the preference parameters for public goods, a and α,c o u l d
3be interpreted as reﬂecting diﬀerent population levels. As Boadway and Hayashi (1999)
and Lim (2003) show, diﬀerent population levels give rise to diﬀerent marginal beneﬁts
if national governments internalize the beneﬁts of their own residents in choosing their
contributions to public goods.
The public good is supplied privately by Rome and Greece. Both can make direct
contributions of g and γ, but both can also match the contributions of the other country
at the rates m and μ. Both direct contributions and matching contributions are chosen
non-cooperatively by the two countries. The supply prices of the private and the public
good are both ﬁxed and the same in both countries, and are normalized to be unity.
Purchases of the private good and contributions to the public good are ﬁnanced in each
country from exogenous endowments, w and ω. Thus, the budget constraints in Rome
and Greece are w = x + g + mγ and ω = χ + γ + μg, and the total supply of the public
good is G = g + mγ + γ + μg =( 1+μ)g +( 1+m)γ. Notice that countries can diﬀer in
two respects, preferences and endowments. These diﬀerences play no particular role in our
analysis, but simply serve to illustrate some generality in the results.
In what follows, the timing of decisions and events will be important. When there
is only one public good, timing can be divided into two or more stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, one or both countries may be able to commit to a contribution level in the next
stages or to matching the contribution of the other country at some chosen rate. In the
following stages, all base and matching contributions to the international public good are
made, subject to commitments made in the ﬁrst stage. There will be more than one such
stage if subsequent contributions are sequential. We assume that all equilibria are subgame
perfect, so we proceed by backward induction. Wherever convenient, interior solutions will
be assumed. This requires that countries are not too diﬀerent either in their endowments
or in their preferences.
In the remainder of this opening section, we focus on the case in which both can
commit to matching contributions announced in the ﬁrst stage. This corresponds with
the analysis of Guttman (1978) and Danziger and Schnytzer (1991), where full eﬃciency
is achieved. It serves as a benchmark for the cases where there is not full commitment.
4With full commitment, it suﬃces to suppose there are two stages that determine voluntary
contributions. In Stage 1, both Rome and Greece announce rates at which they will match
the contributions of the other. In Stage 2, the two countries make their contributions and
the matching commitments are fulﬁlled. We begin with Stage 2, and then turn to Stage 1.
Stage 2
Given the matching rates m and μ announced in Stage 1, Rome and Greece choose their
contributions g and γ. The solution will be a Nash equilibrium (NE). Assume to begin
with that it is an interior one. The problem of Rome is to choose g to maximize aln[(1 +
μ)g +( 1+m)γ]+l n [ w − g − mγ], given γ, m and μ. The ﬁrst-order condition is:
a(1 + μ)
(1 + μ)g +( 1+m)γ
−
1








where UG and Ux are the derivatives of U(G,x) with respect to G and x. The solution to





am +( 1+m)/(1 + μ)
1+a
γ (2)
Similarly, Greece chooses γ to maximize αln[(1 + μ)g +( 1+m)γ]+l n [ ω − γ − μg], given
g, m and μ. The ﬁrst-order condition is:
α(1 + m)
(1 + μ)g +( 1+m)γ
−
1













αμ +( 1+μ)/(1 + m)
1+α
g (4)
Note that both reaction curves are linear.
Figure 1 depicts the NE for the case in which both Rome and Greece are contributors
and the NE is stable. In particular, the NE outcomes g∗ and γ∗ together solve (2) and (4):
g∗ = D−1 [(1 + α)aw − (am +( 1+m)/(1 + μ))αω]
























The solution will be a stable interior one if Rome’s reaction function, g(γ,m,μ), is ﬂatter
than Greece’s reaction function, γ(g,m,μ), that is, if
1+α
αμ +( 1+μ)/(1 + m)
>
am +( 1+m)/(1 + μ)
1+a
(6)
In this case, we can see that D>0.
The following lemma will prove to be useful in what follows.1
Lemma 1: 1 − mμ  0 ⇐⇒ D  0
Figure 1 also shows the eﬀect of an increase in Rome’s matching rate m, holding μ
constant. This causes the slopes of both reaction curves (2) and (4) to become steeper,
w h i c hi nt u r nc a u s e st h eN Ev a l u eo fg to fall to g∗  and γ to rise to γ∗ .C o n v e r s e l y ,
an increase in μ would cause the reaction curves to become ﬂatter, so g would rise and γ
would fall. More formally, diﬀerentiating the reaction functions g(γ,m,μ)a n dγ(g,m,μ)








1+a −(a +1 /(1 + μ))γ





Therefore, in a stable interior equilibrium where D>0, ∂γ/∂m > 0 since both determi-
nants on the right-hand side of (7) are positive. Similarly, it is straightforward to show
that ∂g/∂m< 0i fD<0.
Note ﬁnally that, as the proof of Lemma 1 indicates, the larger is the diﬀerence
between mμ and unity, the larger will be the diﬀerence in the absolute value of the slopes
1 The proof follows by rearranging (6), for the case of D>0, to yield:
(1 + a)(1 + m)
(1 + m)αμ +1+μ
>
(1 + μ)am +1+m
(1 + α)(1 + μ)
, or
1+a + m + am
1+μ + mμα + αμ
>
1+mμa + m + am
1+μ + α + αμ
By inspection, the inequality holds if mμ < 1. The same argument applies for the case where
the inequality in (6) goes the other way, or is an equality.
6of the two reaction curves. As the sizes of the matching contributions—and therefore
mμ—rise, the two curves approach the same slope. When the reaction curves overlap,
as shown by the dashed line in Figure 1, mμ = 1 and the Stage 2 NE contributions g
and γ are indeterminate (although as we shall see, total contributions by each country
are determinate). Moreover, as mμ increases above unity, at least one reaction curve falls
below the dashed line and the relative sizes of their slopes are reversed.
Stage 1
The NE in Stage 2 yields contribution functions g(m,μ)a n dγ(m,μ) (abusing notation)
as well as indirect utility functions u(m,μ)a n dυ(m,μ), where:
u(m,μ)=aln[(1 + μ)g(m,μ)+( 1+m)γ(m,μ)] + ln[w − g(m,μ) − mγ(m,μ)]
υ(m,μ)=αln[(1 + μ)g(m,μ)+( 1+m)γ(m,μ)] + ln[ω − γ(m,μ) − μg(m,μ)]
(8)
Both countries anticipate these outcomes in Stage 1. Begin with the case where mμ < 1,
so the Stage 2 NE is unique and, by assumption, interior.
Consider Rome’s choice of m,g i v e nμ. Diﬀerentiating u(m,μ) in (8) with respect to















= D−1a(1 + a)(1 − mμ)
(1 + m)2 (9)
where the last equality uses ∂γ/∂m from (7). Given that we are evaluating this starting
at an interior stable solution, D>0 and therefore, 1−mμ > 0 by Lemma 1. This implies
that Rome’s utility is increasing in m in a stable interior solution. Starting at an interior
solution, Rome would want to increase m until the Stage 2 equilibrium goes to a corner.
In terms of Figure 1, Rome will increase m until its own reaction curve coincides with the
dashed line joining the two intercepts for the reaction curves, causing its own contribution
to fall to zero, and Greece’s direct contribution to become γ = αω/(1 + α).
In fact, in this scenario, Rome will not increase m beyond the point at which this
corner solution is reached. To see this, ﬁrst ﬁnd the value of m at which g just becomes
zero, so the reaction curves just intersect along the γ axis. The value of m at which g =0
can be obtained from (6) as:
m
0 =
(1 + α)aw − αω/(1 + μ)
(a +1 /(1 + μ))αω
7When g = 0, Greece’s reaction function (4) simpliﬁes to γ = αω/(1 + α), which is in-
dependent of m. Any further increase in m increases G through an increase in Rome’s
matching contribution alone. Rome’s preferred choice of m when g = 0 can be determined
by maximizing aln[(1 + m)γ]+l n [ w − mγ], giving:
m =
(1 + α)aw − αω
(1 + a)αω
 m0 for μ  0
That means that Rome would not want to increase m above m0, and would even like to
reduce m if i tc o u l dh o l dt h ev a l u eo fg at zero, which we assume it cannot. Therefore,
given μ  0 and starting in an interior stable contribution equilibrium, Rome will increase
m until it just crowds out itself and no more, that is, until its reaction curve just coincides
with the dashed line joining the two intercepts in Figure 1.
The same logic applies to Greece’s behavior. Starting at an interior solution, Greece
will want to increase μ until its reaction curve coincides with the dashed line. If both
Rome and Greece behave this way, m and μ will increase to the point where both reaction
curves coincide along the dashed line. When this occurs, mμ =1 .
The intuition for these results is as follows. When mμ < 1, it will be the case that
1/(1 + μ) >m / (1 + m). Now, 1/(1 + μ) is the marginal cost to Rome of contributing
directly to the public good when its contributions receive a matching rate of μ from Greece.
And, m/(1 + m) is the marginal cost of contributing indirectly by subsidizing Greece’s
contributions at the rate m. Therefore, when mμ < 1, it will be cheaper for Rome to
subsidize Greece than to contribute directly itself. As m increases, γ will rise and g will
fall until g = 0. At that point, Greece is at a corner solution and any further contribution
by Rome will be equivalent to a direct contribution. The same logic applies to Greece.
Suppose now that we are at the point where both reaction curves overlap and mμ =1 .
Let m∗ and μ∗ be the matching rates that lead to the reaction curves of Rome and Greece
coinciding with the dashed line in Figure 1, where m∗μ∗ = 1. It is straightforward to show








This will be an equilibrium for Stage 1 since, as we now show, neither country would
deviate from it. If, say, Rome increases m above m∗, then its reaction curve lies below
the common reaction curve for (m∗,μ ∗), while Greece’s will be above. A stable Stage 2
equilibrium will be a corner solution with g =0a n dγ = αω/(1 + α). The change in



















since both g and γ are now independent of m.G i v e nt h a tg =0a n dγ = αω/(1 + α), we






(1 + α)w[(1 + a)αω +( 1+α)aw]
< 0
Therefore, Rome will be worse oﬀ by increasing its matching rate above m∗. Similarly,
if it reduces m below m∗, its reaction curve will move above the common reaction curve
for (m∗,μ ∗) and Greece’s will move below. A corner solution will result with γ =0a n d
g = aw/(1 + a). In this case, if the Stage 2 equilibrium is γ =0a n dg = aw/(1 + a),
then du/dm = 0, so Rome can be no better oﬀ by increasing m. An analogous argument
applies for Greece.
The intuition developed above applies here as well. When m∗μ∗ =1 ,1 /(1 + μ∗)=
m∗/(1 + m∗)a n d1 /(1 + m∗)=μ∗/(1 + μ∗). The ﬁrst of these says that the marginal
cost to Rome of contributing directly at the subsidized rate μ∗ is equal to the marginal
cost of contributing indirectly using a matching rate m∗. The second says the same for
Greece. Thus, if Rome were to increase its matching rate, starting from an equilibrium
with (m∗,μ ∗), Rome would be contributing indirectly at a cost higher than the cost at
which it can contribute directly. The same would apply for Greece. Therefore, starting
2 When m =1 /μ, the reaction curve (2) for Rome becomes g(γ)=aw/(1 + a) − mγ.T h e
slope, −m, equals the slope of the dashed line, −(aw/αω)·(1+α)/(1+a), yielding the result.
9from an equilibrium where matching rates are (m∗,μ ∗), neither country would want to
increase their matching rate further.3
Some properties of the Stage 1 equilibrium with m∗ and μ∗ given by (10) are as follows.
1) Given that the reaction curves in Stage 2 coincide, direct contributions are indeter-
minate. Nonetheless, total contributions are determinate. This follows from the fact








Total contributions are determined uniquely by:
g + m∗γ =
aw
1+a




2) The subgame perfect equilibrium is eﬃcient. To see this, note that 1 = m∗μ∗ implies
that 1/(1 + m∗)+1 /(1 + μ∗) = 1. From the Stage 2 ﬁrst-order conditions for Rome


















3 The outcome (m∗,μ ∗) is not the only conceivable equilibrium. Suppose mμ > 1a n dt h e
reaction curves intersect below the dashed line in Figure 1. Then, D<0 by Lemma 1,
and we have an unstable equilibrium. If Rome expects that an increase in m will cause the
equilibrium to move to another unstable one, u(·) will rise with an increase in m by (9).
Greece will reason the same way so will increase μ. In this case, both countries will continue
to increase their subsidy rates until the reaction curves coincide with the axes of Figure 1
leading to an equilibrium at the origin with g = γ = 0. In eﬀect, the ability of both countries
to commit will lead to an outcome that is inferior to the case of Figure 1 where neither can
commit! We might reasonably rule out this outcome, since it requires that each country
anticipates that equilibria attained for mμ > 1 will be the unstable ones.
103) The total contributions each country makes replicate their Lindahl contributions, as
shown by Danziger and Schnytzer (1991). To see this, note that if 1/(1+μ∗)i sR o m e ’ s
Lindahl price, Rome’s total contribution would be the Lindahl price times G:
1
1+μ∗G =
(1 + μ∗)g +( 1+m∗)γ
1+μ∗ = g +
1+m∗
1+μ∗ γ = g + m∗γ
using μ∗ =1 /m∗. Thus, Rome’s total contribution, g +m∗γ, equals its marginal rate
of substitution, 1/(1 + μ∗), applied to G. The same applies for Greece.
4) The well-known Neutrality Theorem analyzed by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986)
(see also Shibata (1971) and Warr (1983)) does not apply in this two-stage matching







For a reallocation of endowments so that dw = −dω, the change in the level of
provision of the public good is:
dG =
(a − α)dw
(1 + a)(1 + α)
Therefore, a redistribution of endowments toward the country with the higher relative
valuation for the public good will increase the level of provision. Of course, this is
not surprising given that the equilibrium is Lindahl, so it depends on the marginal
valuations of G by both countries, which in turn depends on country wealth levels.
3 The Base Case with Limited Commitment
When both countries cannot commit, there are various options to consider depending on
the policy instrument that can be used for commitment. We consider two classes of cases.
The ﬁrst one is when one country, say Rome, can commit to a matching contribution rate
in the ﬁrst stage, but not to any Stage 2 direct contributions. The second is when the
commitment is to a quantity contribution in Stage 2. In this case, commitment is more
complicated, and both countries may have some commitment ability as we shall see.
113.1 Rome Commits to a Matching Rate
In this case, Rome commits only to a matching rate m. Both Rome and Greece then
participate in a Nash contribution game in Stage 2, since Rome cannot commit to a
contribution. The analysis parallels the full commitment case above except that μ =0 .
As usual, we solve Stage 2 ﬁrst and then move backward to Stage 1.
Stage 2
Given μ = 0, we can obtain the reaction curves for Rome and Greece immediately as
special cases of (2) and (4). Assuming an interior solution as before, the solution to these
equations gives the NE contributions in Stage 2:
g(m)=
(1 + α)aw − (1 + m(1 + a))αω
D
,γ (m)=
(1 + a)αω − aw/(1 + m)
D
(12)
where D =( 1+α)(1 + a) − (1 + (1 + a)m)/(1 + m) > 0 so that an interior solution is
always stable. As before, we can verify that ∂g/∂m < 0a n d∂γ/∂m > 0a sl o n ga st h e
solution is interior. Utility levels resulting from the NE in Stage 2 are then analogs of (8):
u(m)=aln[g(m)+( 1+m)γ(m)] + ln[w − g(m) − mγ(m]
υ(m)=αln[g(m)+( 1+m)γ(m)] + ln[ω − γ(m)]
(13)
Stage 1
In Stage 1, Rome chooses m,t a k i n gμ = 0 as given. Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst equation in







= D−1a(1 + a)(g/(1 + m)+γ)
(1 + m)G
> 0
Therefore, Rome will increase its Stage 2 utility by increasing its matching contribution
m as long as the NE in contributions remains an interior one. Since g is declining in m,
Rome will in fact increase m until it crowds itself out. In terms of Figure 1, Rome will
increase m until its reaction curve coincides with the dashed line.
It is straightforward to verify that Rome would not increase m beyond the point at
12which g just gets crowded out.4 The equilibrium level of provision of the public good,
denoted by Gm, is then:





















Notice that Greece’s contribution in this case is equal to the sum of its direct and
matching contributions in the full-commitment case. Given that Greece’s contribution
is independent of m when g = 0, Rome could choose to replicate the full-commitment
outcome by increasing its matching rate until Gm = G∗. Since the equilibrium induced by
Rome’s choice of m in Stage 1 involves Gm <G ∗, Rome’s utility must be higher in this case
than in the full-commitment case, despite the fact that the outcome is ineﬃcient. However,
since Greece’s total contribution is the same in both cases but Gm <G ∗, Greece’s utility
is lower in this case than when both countries can commit.
Moreover, Greece is in fact worse-oﬀ in this case than in the NE with no commitment
(m = μ = 0). Since Rome increases its matching rate until it crowds out its direct
contribution, Rome’s total contribution is the product of the equilibrium matching rate






(1 + a)(1 + α)
We can easily verify that this is smaller than Rome’s contribution in the no-commitment
case. Therefore, the introduction of the matching scheme increases γ more than it increases
G, which necessarily makes Greece worse-oﬀ given that, at the no-commitment equilibrium,
an equal increase in γ and G would reduce Greece’s utility.
4 From (12), the value of m for which g =0i s :m = ((1+α)aw−αω)/((1+a)αω). Moreover,
with μ = g = 0, Greece’s reaction function is simply γ = αω/(1 + α), independent of m.
Any further increase in m will still increase the total supply of the public good, but it will all
come from Rome. Given g =0 ,R o m e ’ sc h o i c eo fm maximizes aln[(1 + m)γ]+l n [ w − mγ].
From the ﬁrst-order condition, we obtain the above. Therefore, Rome’s preferred choice of
m just crowds out g.
133.2 Rome Commits to an Unconditional Contribution
Suppose now that Rome can commit to a quantity contribution in Stage 2. Two alterna-
tives are of interest. The ﬁrst, considered in this subsection, is that the contribution is
not conditional on Greece’s contribution. This is simply the case in which Rome acts as a
Stackelberg leader with respect to Greece (as in Varian, 1994a). The second case is that
in which Rome’s contribution is contingent on Greece’s contribution being at least some
stated level. This case, which we refer to as a quantity-contingent mechanism (QCM), is
taken up in the next subsection.
The problem involves two stages. In Stage 1, Rome commits unconditionally to a
level of contribution g regardless of what Greece contributes in Stage 2. Naturally, in
calculating g, Rome anticipates the eﬀect of its choice on Greece’s contribution γ.
Beginning again with Stage 2, Greece chooses γ to maximize αln[g + γ]+l n [ ω − γ],







In Stage 1, Rome anticipates γ(g)a n dc h o o s e sg to maximize aln[g + γ(g)] + ln[w − g].





(1 + a)αω − aw + ω
(1 + a)(1 + α)
(15)
The equilibrium level of provision of public good, denoted Gs, is then:
Gs = g + γ =
aα(w + ω)
(1 + a)(1 + α)
<G m <G ∗
It is clear from this that a reallocation of endowments across countries will not aﬀect
the equilibrium provision of the public good. Moreover, if dw = −dω, (15) implies that
dg = dw and dγ = dω. Therefore, as noted in Varian (1994a), the analog of the Neutrality
Theorem applies, as in the NE with no commitment.
We can compare Rome’s utility from this Stackelberg outcome with the case where
Rome can commit to a matching contribution. In the Stackelberg case, Greece’s maximum
14contribution, obtained when g =0 ,i sγ = αω/(1 + α), which is the same as Greece’s
equilibrium contribution in the case where Rome commits to a matching rate. Suppose
that Greece’s contribution were held ﬁxed at that level for any g. Then, if we choose g to






(1 + a)(1 + α)
which is equal to Rome’s matching (and total) contribution in the case where it commits to
a matching rate. Therefore, Rome would choose to replicate the outcome of the matching-
contribution case. But clearly, the fact that Greece’s contribution in the Stackelberg case
does not remain ﬁxed when Rome increases g reduces Rome’s utility. We therefore conclude
that, when only Rome can commit, Rome is better-oﬀ if it commits to a matching rate
than to an unconditional quantity contribution.
3.3 Rome Commits to a Quantity-Contingent Mechanism
A QCM is a matching plan involving discrete quantities rather than a matching rate
applying to quantities continuously. Under a QCM, Rome commits to a given contribution
contingent on Greece’s contribution being at least some threshold amount. If Greece does
not meet the threshold, Rome no longer provides its committed amount, and the outcome
reverts to some fallback situation, which itself depends on the ability of the two countries
to commit. Rome takes into consideration the fallback situation and designs the QCM to
induce Greece to participate. The fallback situation is thus important in determining the
parameters of the QCM and therefore the payoﬀs attained by each country.
To take account of the commitments that determine the fallback position, it is useful
to characterize the QCM as a three-stage procedure. In the Stage 1, Rome announces
its QCM. This speciﬁes that if Greece’s contribution γ in Stage 2 is no less than some
threshold level, ˜ γ, Rome will contribute an amount ˜ g in Stage 3. Otherwise, Rome will
no longer be obliged to contribute ˜ g, and, instead, it will contribute some fallback level
of g (lower than ˜ g). Moreover, Greece may make a further contribution in Stage 3. The
fallback contributions depend upon the ability of either Rome or Greece to commit to a
contribution in Stage 3 in the event that ˜ g and ˜ γ are not realized. In equilibrium, ˜ γ and
15˜ g will in fact be realized, but the values set by Rome depend upon the fallback outcomes.
As we will see below, ˜ g and ˜ γ calculated by Rome and also g and γ that would emerge in
the fallback situation depend on how we specify each country’s commitment ability and
the levels of discrete quantities to which they can commit. These diﬀerences aﬀect the two
countries’ utilities in fallback situations, and thus aﬀect the divisions of surplus between
them when a QCM is actually implemented.
In what follows, we consider three diﬀerent fallback situations. In the ﬁrst, Rome can
commit to a zero contribution in the event that Greece does not meet the contribution
threshold ˜ γ. In the second, Greece can commit to a zero contribution in Stage 3 (after
having made a contribution γ in Stage 2). Thus, Greece is eﬀectively a Stackelberg leader
in the fallback situation. In the ﬁnal case, neither country can commit to a contribution in
Stage 3, so the fallback outcome is eﬀectively a NE in contributions. The QCM equilibrium
outcomes turn out to be similar in one key respect: all yield an eﬃcient supply of the public
good. The only diﬀerence among them is the division of the surplus. That being so, it
suﬃces to undertake the full analysis of equilibrium in the ﬁrst case only. The other cases
follow immediately once the fallback situation is speciﬁed.
3.3.1 Rome can Commit to a Zero Contribution if γ<˜ γ
The order of events is as follows. Rome announces ˜ γ and ˜ g ﬁrst. Then, Greece chooses
γ in Stage 2. In Stage 3, if γ  ˜ γ, Rome supplies ˜ g;o t h e r w i s e ,g = 0. Whether Greece
chooses γ  ˜ γ depends upon the utility obtained in the fallback position, that is, Greece’s
reservation utility. Rome must ensure that the QCM gives Greece its reservation utility
for the QCM to operate. We begin by specifying Greece’s reservation utility. Rome will
then use that to determine its choice of ˜ γ and ˜ g.
Greece’s Reservation Utility
In the fallback position, Rome fulﬁlls its commitment to set g = 0. In Stage 2, Greece
anticipates this and selects its contribution γ to solve
max
{γ}
Υ = αln[γ]+l n [ ω − γ]
16This yield Greece’s optimal contribution, which is just the value of its reaction function





Note for future reference that this is the same amount that Greece contributes when Rome














Rome’s Choice of a QCM
Rome anticipates that Greece will only participate in the QCM if Greece achieves at least
its reservation utility level. The problem for Rome in designing the QCM is therefore
to choose the values of g and γ that maximize its own utility subject to the constraint
that Greece obtains at least its reservation utility level. Naturally, the constraint will be
binding: Greece will just obtain its reservation utility by participating in the QCM. The
Lagrangian for Rome’s problem is:
L = aln[g + γ]+l n [ w − g]+λ[αln[g + γ]+l n [ ω − γ] − Υ res] (17)




















=0 o r UG + λ(ΥG − Υχ) = 0 (19)
and the binding constraint, where Υres is given by (16). The solutions to this problem then
give ˜ g and ˜ γ in the QCM. Thus, Rome commits to g =˜ g in Stage 3 if Greece contributes
γ  ˜ γ in the Stage 2, but zero if Greece contributes any less than ˜ γ.
It is straightforward to show that the QCM yields an equilibrium in which Greece
contributes ˜ γ and Rome contributes ˜ g.5 First, neither Rome nor Greece would want to
5 This proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3 in Andreoni (1998).
17contribute more than ˜ g or ˜ γ. To see this, note that by the ﬁrst-order conditions (18) and
(19), it must be the case that UG − Ux < 0a n dΥG − Υχ < 0, since λ>0. That is, total
G is too high from each individual country’s point of view. Second, neither country would
contribute less than the amounts ˜ g and ˜ γ speciﬁed by the QCM. In the case of Rome, it
is assumed that a commitment to the QCM is binding, so g cannot be reduced below ˜ g
(although doing so would make Rome better oﬀ ex post since UG −Ux < 0). If Greece sets
γ lower than ˜ γ, anticipating Rome’s response as speciﬁed by the announced plan, Rome
acts according to the plan and each gets its reservation utility. Thus, Greece cannot be
better oﬀ by lowering γ below ˜ γ.T h u s˜ g and ˜ γ can be sustained as Nash equilibrium in
the game.
Remarkably, the QCM equilibrium is eﬃcient. To see this, note that Rome’s problem
in (17) is essentially a Pareto-optimizing one. Combining the last two equations in (18)







In this eﬃcient outcome, Greece just obtains the reservation utility level Υ res, while Rome
gets the remaining surplus from internalizing the free-rider problem.
It follows immediately that whatever the reservation utility level that Greece must be
given in order to willingly provide ˜ γ, the above analysis will apply. As we have seen, the
reservation level of utility is determined by the fallback outcome, which in turn depends
upon commitment ability in Stage 3. The implication is that, whatever we assume about
commitment in Stage 3, the QCM will yield an eﬃcient outcome. Diﬀerent outcomes will
divide this surplus from internalizing the free-rider problem between Rome and Greece dif-
ferently, and we brieﬂy consider two other fallback situations below. First, some comments
on this QCM equilibrium should be made.
The QCM equilibrium resembles the point provision results found in Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989), Admati and Perry (1991) and Andreoni (1998). In these papers, the
technology of the public good is such that it is produced or purchased if and only if
total contributions exceed a certain threshold. Then, in an important subset of equilibria
18found in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and in some of the cases analyzed by Admati and
Perry (1991) and Andreoni (1998), the aggregate level of private provision is exactly at
the threshold. Eﬃciency obtains in many of the cases analyzed by these papers. The
experimental outcomes of Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and Cadsby and Maynes (1999)
support the theoretical results in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). A QCM does not involve
a technological threshold in the production or purchase of the public good: continuous
amounts can be supplied. However, the player who commits to a QCM eﬀectively uses a
threshold to leverage a given contribution by the other player.
As mentioned, a property of the QCM outcome is that Rome, who sets the matching
plan and moves in the last stage, gets all surplus from trade, while Greece, whose contri-
bution is being matched, only gets its reservation utility. In principle, we might be able to
introduce some reduced-form bargaining over surplus division between the two countries
and allow Greece to get some of the surplus. Suppose, for example, that Greece can bar-
gain with Rome and manage to get a level of utility of kΥres in the QCM, where k is some
constant greater than unity. Then Rome needs to change ˜ g and ˜ γ accordingly to make
Greece participation constraint hold with equality at kΥres. The outcome would still be
eﬃcient but at a diﬀerent point on the utility possibility frontier.
3.3.2 Greece can Commit to a Zero Contribution in Stage 3
In this case, if Greece contributes less than ˜ γ in Stage 2, it, but not Rome, can commit
to contributing zero in Stage 3. This eﬀectively makes Greece a Stackelberg leader in
the fallback situation. The calculation of Greece’s reservation utility involves solving the
Stackelberg game backward. In the last stage, Rome takes γ as given and chooses g to
























+l n [ ω − γ]
As in Varian (1994a), the solution to this depends on the comparison between the utility
Greece obtains if it crowds out Rome’s contribution completely and the utility Greece gets

















{αln[γ]+l n [ ω − γ]}
Comparing this with the case above where Rome can commit to a zero contribution in
Stage 3, if Greece ﬁnds it optimal to crowd out Rome’s contribution, reservation utilities
will be exactly the same as in (16). On the other hand, if Greece ﬁnds it optimal not
to crowd out Rome’s contribution, its reservation utility is higher in this case than when
Rome can commit to a zero contribution in Stage 3.
Given this reservation utility level, the remainder of the analysis of the QCM equi-
librium is basically the same as in the previous case. The QCM equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Greece gets its reservation utility, and Rome gets the rest of the surplus. If Greece chooses
not to crowd out Rome in the Stackelberg fallback position, Greece will be better oﬀ and
Rome worse oﬀ than in the case of subsection 3.3.1. Thus, the ability to commit determines
the division of the surplus.
3.3.3 Neither Country can Commit in Stage 3
In this case, both countries behave like Nash competitors in Stage 3 if γ<˜ γ.I nt h ec a s eo f
Greece, even though it has made a contribution in Stage 2, it cannot refrain from making
further contributions in Stage 3. Then, the outcome will be the same as in a static Nash
equilibrium. Let us label the static Nash equilibrium quantities by a superscript N and
the equilibrium quantities when Greece is a Stackelberg leader (the case in 3.3.2) by a
superscript S.
Theorem 2 of Varian (1994a) implies that if Rome contributes nothing in a static
Nash equilibrium so gN = 0, then the Nash equilibrium contributions gN and γN are also
Stackelberg equilibrium quantities. On the other hand, if Rome contributes some positive
amount in a static Nash equilibrium (gN > 0), then γS <γ N and ΥS >Υ N.T h a t i s ,
Greece’s contribution in a Stackelberg equilibrium will be less than its contribution in a
static Nash equilibrium, and its utility is higher in a Stackelberg equilibrium than in a
static Nash equilibrium. Thus, if gN = 0, then it is also the case that gS = 0—meaning
20that Greece is the only contributor in both the Stackelberg and the static NE because
of relatively large diﬀerences in wealth or valuations—and the reservation utilities would
be identical in all of the three cases considered. If gN > 0, then Υres is most likely
highest in case 2, where Greece but not Rome can commit to zero contribution in the
last stage, followed by case 3, which is the static Nash equilibrium, and then by case 1,
where Rome can commit to zero contribution and eﬀectively makes itself a Stackelberg
leader. Equivalently, since all QCMs are eﬃcient, Rome obtains the highest utility in case
1, followed by case 3, and then case 2.
3.4 Comparing the QCM with other Outcomes
We saw earlier that Rome is better oﬀ when it can commit to a matching rate than when
it can make an unconditional quantity commitment (and be a Stackelberg leader). Here
we consider whether the QCM would be preferred by Rome to a matching rate. In fact,
comparisons turn out generally to be ambiguous. From Rome’s point of view, the QCM
is attractive because it gets all the incremental surplus from moving to a fully eﬃcient
outcome. On the other hand, the value of that depends upon the two countries’ ability
to commit in Stage 3, which determines the reservation utility that Greece must be given
in the QCM. If the fallback utility that Greece obtains in the QCM is no greater than it
obtains in one of the other remedies, then Rome will prefer the QCM.
Suppose, to take the case most favorable for Rome, that Rome can commit to a fallback
position in which it makes zero contributions. As we have seen, Greece’s contribution in
the fallback situation is αω/(1 + α), which is the same amount it contributes when Rome
sets a matching rate. However, while g = 0 in both cases, Rome makes an indirect
contribution in the matching case since it subsidizes Greece. Therefore, the utility that
Greece obtains in the fallback situation will be less than it receives under a matching
contribution scheme. Since the matching contribution equilibrium is ineﬃcient, less total
surplus is generated. Given that Rome obtains all the incremental surplus in the QCM
game, Rome must be better oﬀ in this case and would prefer to implement a QCM rather
than a matching contribution. (If Rome can commit to a zero contribution in the Stage
213, it can presumably also implement the unconditional contribution scheme. But, we
have already seen that such a scheme is inferior from its perspective than a matching
contribution scheme.)
However, if Greece can commit to a zero contribution in Stage 3, Greece is eﬀectively
a Stackelberg leader in the fallback equilibrium. In this case, Greece’s reservation utility
may well be higher than what it achieves in the matching contribution equilibrium. If so,
the additional incremental surplus that Rome obtains in the QCM may not be enough to
compensate for the fact that Greece obtains higher utility in the QCM than in the matching
case. By the same token, the QCM may or may not be preferable to an unconditional
contribution where Rome assumes Stackelberg leadership. On the other hand, it is not
clear that such a scheme is feasible in this case, because Rome cannot commit to a zero
contribution in Stage 3.
3.5 Summary of Results
The main results from this section can be summarized as follows:
i. If only one country can commit to a matching rate, it will choose its matching rate to
exactly crowd out its own contribution and the level of provision of the public good
will be lower than the eﬃcient level. The country that oﬀers a matching contribution
will be better oﬀ than in both the full commitment equilibrium and the NE with no
commitment. The opposite will hold for the country that is unable to commit to a
matching rate.
ii. If one country commits to an unconditional contribution, the level of provision of the
public good and the level of utility of the country that commits will both be lower
than in the case where commitment is over a matching rate.
iii. If one country commits to a QCM, the level of provision of the public good will be
eﬃcient, independently of the abilities of countries to commit to particular contri-
butions in the fallback outcome. However, the countries’ abilities to commit in the
fallback situations determine how the surplus from implementing the QCM is divided.
22If the country that sets the QCM can commit to a zero contribution in the fallback
situation, it would prefer to set a QCM than committing to a matching rate. However,
this may not be the case in the other fallback situations.
4 Two Public Goods
Suppose now there are two public goods denoted by subscripts 1 and 2. We explore the
consequences of one country—Rome again—being able to commit to various contribution
schemes. We again assume that utility functions are loglinear and take the following form:
U(G1,G 2,x)=a1 lnG1 + a2 lnG2 +l nx, Υ(G1,G 2,χ)=α1 lnG1 + α2 lnG2 +l nχ
This formulation follows Cornes and Itaya (2004), who concentrate on the properties of a
single-stage contribution game.
The possibilities for limited commitment are more extensive now, since only one coun-
try may be able to commit, and the commitment may be over one or both public goods.
We proceed by ﬁrst supposing that Rome can commit to matching and QCM schemes
involving both public goods, and then turn to the case where the commitment is only over
one public good, say G1. These two cases give rise to diﬀerent natural assumptions about
timing. When Rome can commit to both public goods, we assume that contributions by
Rome and Greece to the two public goods are simultaneous, as in Cornes and Itaya. On
the other hand, when Rome can only commit to one public good, contributions are sequen-
tial: those to G1 are made ﬁrst, followed by contributions to G2. While the simultaneous
contribution case yields results that are analogous to the one-public good case already
considered, in the sequential case commitments turn out to be of no consequence.
4.1 Public Goods Determined Simultaneously
Consider ﬁrst the case where Rome can commit to matching rates m1 and m2 applied
to Greece’s contributions γ1 and γ2. Subsequently, the alternative of applying a QCM to
both public goods will be analyzed.
234.1.1 Rome Commits to Matching Rates
There are two stages as in the one-public good case. In Stage 1, Rome announces matching
rates mi, i =1 ,2. Then, in Stage 2, both countries make contributions gi and γi.A su s u a l ,
we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
Stage 2
At this stage, matching rates m1 and m2 have been announced, and both countries choose
their contributions, given those of the other country. Rome’s problem is:
max
{g1,g2}
a1 ln[g1 +( 1+m1)γ1]+a2 ln[g2 +( 1+m2)γ2]+l n[ w − g1 − m1γ1 − g2 − m2γ2]












=0 i =1 ,2 (20)
Thus, in an interior solution for Rome, public good output levels must satisfy G1/G2 =
a1/a2.I f G1/G2 >a 1/a2 in equilibrium, Rome would only contribute to public good 2,












=0 i =1 ,2 (21)
In this case, an interior solution would require G1/G2 =( α1/α2)(1+m1)/(1+m2). If this
equality is not satisﬁed in equilibrium, Greece would only contribute to one public good.
Both countries will contribute to both public goods only in the improbable case in
which a1/a2 =( α1/α2)(1+m1)/(1+m2). If we ignore this knife-edge case, the implication
is that there are three types of equilibria that are of interest (ruling out the corner solution
where only one country is a contributor, as in our earlier analysis). In Case 1, which we
shall see is the typical equilibrium outcome, Rome contributes to one public good, and
Greece to both. In Case 2, each country contributes only to one of the public goods. Case
3 is where Rome contributes to both and Greece to one. Suppose a1/a2 >α 1/α2,s oR o m e
has a relative preference for G1. The Stage 2 outcomes in these three cases are as follows.
24Case 1: g1 > 0,g 2 =0a n dγ1 > 0,γ 2 > 0
Relatively too much of public good 2 is being supplied from Rome’s perspective, so it will
set m2 = 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions on g1, γ1 and γ2 in (20) and (21) apply. Solving
them jointly and using m2 = 0 yields the following NE contributions in Stage 2:
g1 = D−1 [a1w(1 + m1)(1 + α1 + α2) − (1 + m1 + a1m1)(1 + m1)α1ω]
γ1 = D−1 [(1 + a1)(1 + m1)α1ω − a1(1 + α2)w]
γ2 = D−1 [a1α2ω]
(22)
where D = α1(1+a1)(1+m1)+a1(1+α2) > 0. Diﬀerentiating with respect to m1 yields














D2 < 0 (23)
Using these solutions for Nash equilibrium contributions, we can write Stage 2 indirect
utility functions for Rome and Greece as follows:
u(m1)=a1 ln[g1(m1)+( 1+m1)γ1(m1)] + a2 ln[γ2(m1)] + ln[w − g1(m1) − m1γ1(m1)]
υ(m1)=α1 ln[g1(m1)+( 1+m1)γ1(m1)] + α2 ln[γ2(m1)] + ln[ω − γ1(m1) − γ2(m1)]
(24)
Case 2: g1 > 0,g 2 =0a n dγ1 =0 ,γ 2 > 0








Greece’s contribution is independent of the matching rate oﬀered by Rome, while g1 will
be decreasing in m2. A matching rate m1 would be ineﬀective in this case unless it is large
enough to induce Greece to contribute, that is, to switch to Case 1.
Case 3: g1 > 0,g 2 > 0a n dγ1 > 0,γ 2 =0
In this case, ﬁrst-order conditions for g1, g2 and γ1 in (20) and (21) apply. Solving these
for their Nash equilibrium values yields:
g1 = D−1 [a1(1 + α1)(1 + m1)w − α1(1 + m1)(1 + a2 +( 1+a1 + a2)m1)ω]
g2 = D−1 [a2α1(1 + m1)(w + ω)]
γ1 = D−1 [(1 + a1 + a2)α1(1 + m1)ω − a1w]
(26)
25where D = a1 +( 1+a1 + a2)α1(1 + m1) > 0. It can be shown that γ1 and g2 are both
increasing in m1 while the eﬀect on g1 is ambiguous. Stage 2 indirect utility functions
analogous to (24) apply here as well.
Stage 1
In this stage, Rome chooses its matching rates to apply to Greece’s contributions. Consider
ﬁrst Case 1. As mentioned, Rome would not use m2 since from its point of view, G2 is
already relatively too high. To determine whether it would use m1, diﬀerentiate u(m1)i n




























Therefore, Rome will oﬀer a matching rate on γ1. Inspection of the expression for du/dm1
indicates that there will be an optimal value of m1 ≡ m∗
1 > 0f o rw h i c hdu/dm1 =0 .
Suppose next that, in the absence of subsidies, the outcome is in Case 2 where both
countries are specializing in one of the public goods. As the reaction functions in (25)
indicate, Greece’s contribution γ2 will not be aﬀected by changes in m2, so any increase
in m2 starting from zero will be equivalent to a direct contribution by Rome to G2.S i n c e
Rome has already chosen not to contribute, this must be welfare-decreasing. Moreover,
a small increase in m1 starting from zero will have no eﬀect either unless G1/G2 is very
close to α1/α2 so that Greece is initially just on the margin of contributing to public good
1. Otherwise, as m1 is increased from zero, it will have no eﬀect until it reaches the value,
say m1, such that G1/G2 = α1(1 + m1)/α2. At this point, Greece will be on the verge of
contributing to G1.A sm1 increases from m1, Greece will gradually increase γ1 starting
from zero. If m1 <m ∗
1, Rome will increase m1: its utility will gradually increase from that
attained in Case 2 to that attained at the optimum in Case 1.
6 The last inequality holds because in Case 2, a1/a2 >G 1/G2 = α1/α2.
26Finally, consider Case 3. A small subsidy on good 2 will not be eﬀective since γ2 =0 .
Suppose a subsidy on good 1 is contemplated. Diﬀerentiating Rome’s utility in this case,







This would seem to indicate that Rome would want to match Greece’s contributions at
some rate. However, even a small matching rate on Greece’s contribution γ1 will cause
G1/G2 to rise. Rome will go to a corner in which it contributes only to good 2, that is,
Case 2 above. The analysis of Case 2 will then apply: provided m1 <m ∗
1, Rome will want
to increase m1 up to m∗
1.
The upshot of this section is that as long as m∗
1 > m1, Rome will ﬁnd it useful to
impose a matching rate of m1 = m∗
1 regardless of which case applies in the absence of
matching contributions. On the other hand, if m∗
1 < m1, a subsidy will only be of value
to Rome if the initial equilibrium is in Case 1.
4.1.2 Rome Commits to a QCM
The idea of a QCM in the context of two public goods is similar to that with one public
good. The plan consists of announced contribution levels (˜ γ1, ˜ g1, ˜ γ2, ˜ g2) in Stage 1. If
both γ1  ˜ γ1 and γ2  ˜ γ2 in Stage 2, Rome contributes ˜ g1 and ˜ g2.O t h e r w i s e ,R o m ea n d
Greece move to some fallback situation in Stage 3, which depends upon the ability of each
party to commit in this stage. Fallback situations might be complicated to characterize
for the two-public-good case, given the possibility of the diﬀerent cases outlined above and
the fact that a wide variety of commitment options exist for Stage 3. Fortunately for our
purposes, we do not need an explicit characterization of fallback situations, as long as we
know that some reservation utility for Greece would emerge. Rome then incorporates this
reservation utility into its calculation of the four QCM quantities.





U(G1,G 2,x)=a1 ln[g1 + γ1]+a2 ln[g2 + γ2]+l n [ w − g1 − g2]
s.t.Υ(G1,G 2,χ)=α1 ln[g1 + γ1]+α2 ln[g2 + γ2]+l n [ ω − γ1 − γ2]  Υ
res
We can write the Lagrangian in shorthand form as follows:
L = U(G1,G 2,x)+λ[Υ(G1,G 2,χ) − Υres]
where Gi = gi + γi, x = w − g1 − g2,a n dχ = ω − γ1 − γ2. The ﬁrst-order conditions on
gi and γi can be written:
UGi − Ux + λΥGi =0 i =1 ,2 (27)
UGi + λ(ΥGi − Υχ)=0 i =1 ,2 (28)














Thus, eﬃciency can be achieved if one country can commit to a QCM, regardless of the
fallback position. We can show, following the same procedure as before, that this QCM
outcome is actually an equilibrium. Neither Greece nor Rome would want to increase their
contributions above the QCM. Greece would not want to decrease its contributions, and
Rome has committed not to do so.
4.2 Public Goods Determined Sequentially
Suppose now commitments apply only to G1. A sa b o v e ,w eb e g i nw i t ht h ec a s ew h e r e
Rome commits to a matching rate, and then turn to the QCM case.
4.2.1 Rome Commits to a Matching Rate
Now we need to distinguish three stages. In Stage 1, Rome commits to a matching rate
m1 applied to Greece’s contribution γ1. In Stage 2, Rome and Greece simultaneously
contribute g1 and γ1. In Stage 3, they contribute g2 and γ2 to the second public good.
28Equilibrium outcomes are sub-game perfect, and we assume that contributions are interior
in the last stage, though as we shall see not necessarily in Stage 2. Begin with Stage 3.
Stage 3
In this stage, Rome and Greece simultaneously choose g2 and γ2,g i v e nt h ev a l u e so fg1,
γ1 and m1 chosen in the previous two stages. The problems for Rome and Greece are:
max
g2
a2 ln[g2 + γ2]+l n [ w − g1 − m1γ1 − g2], max
γ2
α2 ln[g2 + γ2]+l n [ ω − γ1 − γ2]
Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst-order conditions yield the reaction functions:
g2 =











Solving these for g2 and γ2, we ﬁnd Nash equilibrium contributions to be:
g2(g1,γ 1,m 1)=D−1[(1 + α2)a2(w − g1 − m1γ1) − α2(ω − γ1)]
γ2(g1,γ 1,m 1)=D−1[(1 + a2)α2(ω − γ1) − a2(w − g1 − m1γ1)]
(29)
where D =( 1+a2)(1 + α2) − 1 > 0. Total contributions are given by G2(g1,γ 1,m 1)=
g2(g1,γ 1,m 1)+γ2(g1,γ 1,m 1), which using (29) can be written:
G2(G1)=D−1[a2α2(w + ω − G1)] (30)
where G1 = g1 +( 1+m1)γ1.T h u s ,G2 is decreasing in total contributions to G1, but is
independent of the relative contributions of each country.
Using (29), private goods’ consumption in Rome and Greece can be obtained from
x = w − g1 − m1γ1 − g2 and χ = ω − γ1 − γ2:
x(G1)=D−1[α2(w + ω − G1]
χ(G1)=D−1[a2(w + ω − G1]
(31)
These results imply that whatever the value of m1, a Neutrality Theorem applies to Stage
3 contributions, assuming there is an interior solution. That is, G2, x, χ and the utility
levels of each country are not only independent of income redistribution across countries
29but are also independent of the relative contributions of each country to G1, given its level.
Especially relevant is the fact that Stage 3 allocations are also independent of m1.
Stage 2
In Stage 2, Rome and Greece choose g1 and γ1 simultaneously anticipating Nash equilib-
rium outcomes in Stage 3. The problem of Rome is the following, taking as given γ1:
maxg1 a1 ln[g1 +( 1+m1)γ1]+a2 ln[g2(g1,γ 1,m 1)+γ2(g1,γ 1,m 1)]
+ln[w − g1 − m1γ1 − g2(g1,γ 1,m 1)]
The ﬁrst-order conditions to this problem, using (29) and simplifying, give Rome’s reaction
function:





− (1 + m1)γ1
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The analogous problem for Greece yields the following reaction function:









Therefore, the two reaction curves have the same slopes, implying that there will
be a corner solution with only one country contributing. The contributing country will
be determined by the relative size of the intercepts. In particular, the Nash equilibrium
solution is as follows (using G1 = g1 +( 1+m1)γ1 =m a x {g1,(1 + m1)γ1}):
G1 =m a x

a1(w + ω)
(1 + a1 + a2)
,
α1(w + ω)
(1 + α1 + α2)

(32)
Figure 2 illustrates the case in which Rome is the contributing country. Rome’s reaction
curve is shown as a dashed line, while Greece’s is a dotted line.
Stage 1
As the above analysis makes clear, the equilibrium values of G1, G2, x and χ are all
independent of m1. This is a consequence of the Neutrality Theorem applying in Stage 3.
Any subsidy Rome imposes is neutralized by changes in Stage 3 contributions. Therefore,
Rome has no incentive to oﬀer a matching contribution, since it has no eﬀect on the
outcome.
304.2.2 Rome Commits to a QCM
We assume now that the QCM applies only to G1, and equilibrium in G1 occurs before
contributions are made to G2. Outcomes are determined over four stages. In Stage 1, Rome
announces its QCM. Greece then contributes γ1 in Stage 2. In Stage 3, Rome, observing
γ1, contributes g1 and Greece may make a further contribution to good 1. Finally, in
Stage 4, Rome and Greece simultaneously contribute g2 and γ2. In each stage, outcomes
of subsequent stages are anticipated.
The QCM applying to G1 is analogous to the one-public-good case. Rome announces
and commits to a QCM which speciﬁes that, if Greece contributes γ1  ˜ γ1, Rome will
contribute g1 =˜ g1. Otherwise, the fallback outcome applies. For concreteness, we assume
that Rome can commit to g1 =0i fγ1 < ˜ γ1. (Neither country can commit to a contribution
to G2 in Stage 4.) This implies that Greece’s reservation utility is relatively low, and one
might expect that Rome would be able extract a relatively high surplus by applying the
QCM. However, as we shall see, that will not be the case for reasons that are analogous
to the sequential contribution case involving matching rates just considered.
We assume, again, that both countries make positive contributions (g2,γ 2) in Stage
4. This requires that, after the QCM outcome is determined, the distribution of remaining
wealth (w − g1,ω− γ1) is not very unequal. Of course, this distribution is determined
endogenously, but, roughly speaking, a relatively even initial wealth distribution is more
likely to lead to a more even post-Stage 2 wealth distribution.
We begin with Stage 4 and then move back to the prior stages.
Stage 4
The outcomes in this stage follow directly from the analysis of Stage 3 in the matching
rate case, except that now m1 =0 .G i v e ng1 and γ1, Rome and Greece choose g2 and γ2
to maximize their respective utilities, taking the others’ contribution as given. The Nash
equilibrium solution follows immediately from (29) with m1 =0 :
g2(g1,γ 1)=D−1[(1 + α2)a2(w − g1) − α2(ω − γ1)]
γ2(g1,γ 1)=D−1[(1 + a2)α2(ω − γ1) − a2(w − g1]
(33)
31where D =( 1+a2)(1+α2)−1 > 0. Total contributions, G2 = g2(g1,γ 1)+γ2(g1,γ 1), are:
G2(G1)=D−1[a2α2(w + ω − G1)] (34)
Using these, private goods’ consumption in Rome and Greece may be written again as (31).
Thus, we have that NE outcomes in Stage 4, G2(G1), x(G1)a n dχ(G1), are independent
of the distribution of wealth and of the relative contributions of the two countries.
We can then write utility levels for Rome and Greece arising from the prior stages as
U(G1,G 2(G1),x(G1)) = a1 ln[G1]+a2 ln[G2(G1)] + ln[x(G1)]
Υ(G1,G 2(G1),χ(G1)) = α1 ln[G1]+α2 ln[G2(G1)] + ln[χ(G1)]
where G2(g1),x(G1),χ(G2) are given by (34) and (31). The level of G1 is determined in
Stages 1 to 3. However, we do not need to characterize the three stages explicitly in this
case. In fact, it is fairly straightforward to see that Rome will not have any incentive
to oﬀer a QCM. To see this, note that from the above utility functions, the level of G1
is the only variable about which both countries are concerned in Stages 1 to 3. We can
characterize the levels of G1 that would be preferred by Rome and Greece, given their
anticipation of the solution to Stage 4. These levels of G1 solve the following problems:
max
G1
a1 ln[G1]+a2 ln[G2(G1)] + ln[x(G1)], max
G1
α1 ln[G1]+α2 ln[G2(G1)] + ln[χ(G1)]
Using (33), the solutions, denoted by GR
1 and GG










These are the levels of G1 that maximize the utility of each country independently of their
relative contributions to public good 1.
If [a1/(1 + a1 + a2)] > [α1/(1 + α1 + α2)] (the case depicted in Figure 2), then Rome
prefers a higher level of G1 than Greece. In this case, Rome has no incentive to oﬀer a
QCM since, by (32), the Nash equilibrium in contributions would yield its preferred level
of G1. Alternatively, if [a1/(1 + a1 + a2)] < [α1/(1 + α1 + α2)], Rome would not want to
32use a QCM to induce a higher level of provision of G1 since the Nash equilibrium level of
G1, given again by (32), is already above Rome’s preferred level.7 Therefore, when the
two public goods are provided sequentially, Rome cannot make itself better oﬀ than in the
Nash equilibrium, and hence would not oﬀer a QCM.
4.3 Summary of Results
The main results from this section can be summarized as follows:
i. If contributions to the two public goods occur simultaneously, and if one country can
fully commit to matching rates on either public goods, a matching subsidy on one of
the goods will always be used provided the optimal matching rate in Case 1 exceeds
t h er a t er e q u i r e dt om o v ef r o mC a s e s2a n d3t oC a s e1 . O t h e r w i s e ,am a t c h i n g
subsidy will be used only in Case 1 (where the country oﬀering the matching rate
contributes to both public goods).
ii. If contributions to the two public goods take place at the same time and one country
can commit to a QCM applying on both public goods, the level of provision of both
public goods will be eﬃcient.
iii. When contributions to the public goods take place sequentially, a Neutrality Theorem
applies to contributions to the second public good if these contributions are interior.
In turn, that implies that neither a matching subsidy nor a QCM for the public good
contributed ﬁrst will be oﬀered, as the country with the ability to commit cannot
make itself better oﬀ under either of these schemes than in the Nash equilibrium in
contributions.
7 Note that in this latter case, where Rome prefers a lower level of G1 than Greece, Rome
could induce a level of G1 equal to its preferred level by using a QCM which would specify
that, if Greece contributes γ1  ˜ γ1, Rome will contribute g1 =˜ g1, otherwise Rome will
contribute g1 > ˆ g1. However, that requires that Rome be able to commit to a relatively high
level of contribution in the fallback outcome. If this fallback contribution is large enough, it
would induce a level of G2 low enough to make Greece worse oﬀ than under the contributions
speciﬁed in the QCM, despite the large contribution of Rome, and would therefore induce
Greece to comply with the QCM.
335 Concluding Remarks
This paper can be viewed as exploratory in nature. We have considered in a speciﬁc setting
the scope for non-cooperative multi-stage games to emerge that will improve the eﬃciency
of public goods supply in a context with two agents or countries. If one or more of the
countries can commit to a contribution policy, the free-rider problem may be mitigated.
In some cases, the free-rider problem can be overcome fully. The use of loglinear utility
functions for the analysis was adopted to facilitate clear and relatively simple analytical
solutions, and many of the results do not depend on that.
Even in the base case with one public good, many comparisons are ambiguous. Thus,
Rome may or may not prefer a QCM depending on the reservation utility that must be
provided to Greece. It is clear that matters become considerably more complicated once
we leave the simple base case. The main departure we considered was to allow for two
public goods. The eﬀect of this was to reduce the scope for matching schemes. When
only one country can commit, it may not ﬁnd matching contributions to be helpful even
if they can be made to both public goods. On the other hand, the QCM continues to lead
to eﬃciency when it can be applied by one country to both public goods. When either
a matching contribution or a QCM can be applied to only the public good contributed
ﬁrst and when we assume interior contributions to the second, neither scheme can improve
upon the fallback Nash equilibria.
The next obvious extension is to the multi-agent case. It can be shown that if one
country can commit to a QCM in which its contributions are contingent on the aggregate
level of contributions of all other countries, full eﬃciency is maintained. In eﬀect, the
QCM facing all other countries together is like a weakest-link public good in which an
equilibrium is for all to contribute their eﬃcient amounts.
A very large open question remains. What determines which countries can commit?
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Figure 2. Stage 2, Two Public Goods, Sequential Contributions
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